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1. Introduction: hope and danger 
At 18.27 on 12 December 2015 Laurent Fabius brought down his gavel to 
mark the adoption of the Paris Agreement by nearly 200 countries. Even the 
most optimistic commentators agree that the scale and speed of the action 
needed to realise the ambitions of the Agreement is daunting. The history of 
action on climate change gives us no grounds for optimism. But perhaps we still 
have grounds for hope (McKinnon 2014). 
Many things could snuff out this fragile hope. In this paper I shall address 
conduct that explicitly aims to do so: climate change denial (from here on in, 
‘climate denial’). By ‘climate denial’ I mean the deliberate and deceptive 
misrepresentation of the scientific realities of climate change, such as the fact 
that climate change is happening, its anthropogenic causes, and its damaging 
impacts (Dunlap 2013). What I do not mean by ‘climate denial’ are minority or 
outlier positions on aspects of climate science that lie within the range of normal 
and healthy disciplinary disagreement. There is an established international 
network of well funded organisations devoted to organised climate denial, and 
their activity is on the increase (Boussalis and Coan 2016). The epicentre of this 
activity is in America, where climate denial has had a significant impact on public 
opinion (Leiserowitz et al 2014), and has impeded legislation to tackle climate 
change (Farrell 2016; Oreskes and Conway 2012).  
 
1 I would like to thank Ed Hawkins and Patrick Tomlin for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.  
 2 
My question is: should we tolerate climate denial? The ‘we’ in this 
question refers to broadly liberal people and legislators in democratic societies, 
for whom principles of toleration and the virtue of tolerance are of fundamental 
importance in social and political life. Toleration is a matter of principled self-
restraint with respect to conduct that would alter, suppress, or prevent the 
characteristics or conduct of people opposed by the tolerator (McKinnon 2006; 
McKinnon and Castiglione 2003). The tolerant agent refrains from interfering 
with those she dislikes or of whom she disapproves even when she believes that 
her dislike or disapproval is well-grounded. The agents of toleration can be 
individual people - when toleration is likely to manifest as a virtue, or as a civic 
disposition - or institutions, when fundamental political principles, the 
constitution, and laws and their implementation, are framed to respect the limits 
of toleration (McKinnon 2013). Toleration is difficult to justify and hard to 
practice at both the personal and institutional level, particularly for liberals 
(Scanlon 2003a). Liberalism is committed to freedom of association, conscience, 
worship, movement and expression as a matter of fundamental principle (Rawls 
1971). This delivers a distinctive liberal, permissive vision of the limits of 
toleration with respect to acts of expression. Given that climate denial is 
achieved through acts of expression there is a heavy burden of proof attached to 
any liberal proposal to be intolerant of climate denial.2  
My aim in this short paper is to identify the proper site for this debate. 
What are the questions to be answered in deciding whether climate denial lies 
beyond the limits of liberal toleration? Although I do not answer these questions, 
 
2 I ignore here the many ways in which this case could be made on illiberal 
grounds. 
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by correctly identifying them I hope to show that the burden of proof is perhaps 
not as heavy as we initially might have thought.  
2. Climate denial and climate science 
Climate science is complicated, and its uncertainties have roots that are 
difficult for lay people to understand. Climate experts have not done a wonderful 
job of communicating this to the rest of us (Aven and Renn 2015), and climate 
deniers have taken advantage of this to assert spuriously that scientists disagree 
about the core facts of climate change. In fact, 97% of peer reviewed papers 
published between 1991 and 2011 taking a position on climate change assert 
that it is happening and that it is anthropogenic (Skeptical Science 2016a).  
However, the fact that deniers misrepresent climate science is not 
sufficient to justify intolerance of climate denial in the form of legal prohibition, 
and the fact that deniers’ misrepresentations are deliberate makes no difference 
to this conclusion. In his celebrated discussion of freedom of expression, J.S. Mill 
distinguishes three types of case in which minority opinions clash with those of 
the majority, in order to assess the limits of liberal toleration in each case (Mill 
1989). (1) When a contested opinion is false and could be corrected by 
contestation; (2) when a contested opinion is true, but contestation could benefit 
the opinion-holder and wider humanity; (3) when the opinion contested and that 
contesting it share a portion of the truth, in which case contestation benefits 
everyone. Because climate denial is false it can only fit into the second of these 
categories. Specifically (and to use Mill’s example), climate denial prima facie 
could qualify as contestation of the theories of climate science in the same way 
that the theory of phlogiston counts as contestation of the now dominant theory 
of oxygen. Mill argues that in such cases contestation is what enables one theory 
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or approach to triumph over another. It ensures that scientists fully understand 
the grounds of their scientific beliefs, and have justified confidence in the truth of 
their theory or the veracity of their findings. For climate denial to fit Mill’s 
second model it has to be the case that either it benefits scientists, or it benefits 
wider humanity (or both). Are any of these things true? 
Contestation in science is what opens up new fields of scientific enquiry: 
contestation can falsify a conjecture, shift a paradigm, or make a research 
programme degenerate. Contestation is also a continuous process whereby 
refutations of conjectures are attempted, scientific paradigms are refined, or 
research programmes are developed. Present climate denial does not fit these 
models of contestation: it is anti-scientific. Climate deniers are not scientists with 
beliefs about climate change that differ from scientists in the mainstream: 
climate deniers are not scientists at all. Many of them are not trained in climate 
(or any) science, their methods are unscientific (cherry picking data or making 
fundamental errors such as confusing weather events with long term climate 
trends), and they do not submit their writings to professional peer review. The 
anti scientific contestation of climate science offered by deniers is of no benefit 
to climate scientists themselves, and it is legitimate for them to be denied 
employment in and access to universities and research institutions, and to be 
ineligible for resources (such as funding for research) which society makes 
available to support real scientists in their work. 
The conclusion that climate denial is of no benefit to scientists and ought 
not to be tolerated in the Academy is not very surprising.3 It certainly has no 
 
3 The case here is similar to that for excluding Holocaust deniers from the 
Academy. See McKinnon 2007. 
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implications for whether climate denial ought to be legally prohibited. Although 
climate denial does not benefit climate scientists, perhaps it benefits the rest of 
us by improving our understanding of climate science. Perhaps climate deniers 
are gad flies to climate scientists, forcing them to do better in communicating the 
realities of climate change and the uncertainties of climate science to lay people. 
And when the public better understand climate change it becomes more likely 
that effective action will be taken to tackle it (Vainio and Paloniemi 2011). It is 
true that scientists should do more to improve public understanding of climate 
science (Anderson and Bows 2012; Brysse, Oreskes, O’Reilly and Oppenheimer 
2013). But climate denial in the actual world is very far from the gad fly model, 
which makes a Millean appeal to its social utility unconvincing as a foundation 
for tolerating it. 
A different, non-consequentialist line of argument for tolerating climate 
denial is that people have significant, autonomy-related interests in being able to 
say whatever they want in public spaces, even when what they say is nonsense 
and has no social utility at all (Scanlon 2003b). Part of what defines a society as 
democratic is that its members are free to voice idiotic opinions in the pub that 
would get them laughed out of an academic lecture theatre, all else being equal. 
One way in which all else might not be equal is when what is expressed stirs up 
hatred, causes profound offence, or defames a particular group of people 
(Feinberg 1988). However, climate denial is not like this: it is not part of a 
vehicle to hurt and oppress people with particular group-based identities. It is 
true that some prominent climate scientists have suffered smear campaigns, 
death threats, and intimidation at the hands of climate deniers (Mann 2013), but 
these expressive acts are distinct from the denial of climate science I am 
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addressing here and are straightforwardly outside the limits of toleration on any 
account of it (as reflected in statutes in the UK such as the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861).  
Nevertheless, there other ways in which all else is not equal with respect 
to climate denial, and which would be sufficient in at least some spheres to 
override the powerful liberal commitment to freedom of expression as a 
fundament of a democratic society. I shall argue that the following features of 
climate denial could put it beyond the scope of an autonomy based defence of 
freedom of expression: climate denial is propaganda that disguises the harmful 
externalities of the fossil fuel industry, and these externalities are a significant 
cause of present climate change which is endangering human security on a 
global and intergenerational scale. Propagandising climate denial is generated 
and spread by conservative think tanks funded by the fossil fuel industry.  
3. Climate Denial and Conservative Think Tanks 
The climate denial that has perverted legislation to tackle climate change 
(especially in the U.S.), and that has skewed public opinion so as to emasculate 
the demos of the world’s biggest per capita polluting nation in the face of the 
climate crisis, is not the sum of individual acts of free expression as people chew 
the fat in the pub on a Friday night. The climate denial with respect to which all 
else is not equal in the application of autonomy-based liberal arguments for 
freedom of expression is a set of well organised, well funded, strategic, deceptive, 
ideological practices undertaken by a range of Conservative Think Tanks in the 
U.S. which are heavily funded by the fossil fuel industry. I shall call this 
‘industrial’ climate denial, which reflects its scale, systematicity and its sources 
of funding. Using misrepresentation, fallacious reasoning and cherry picking of 
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data, the climate denial strategies of these organisations are as follows 
(Washington and Cook 2011). 
 
1. Claims that climate scientists are in a global conspiracy. For example, in 
2009 servers at the University of East Anglia were hacked and emails 
from climate scientists working in the Climate Research Unit were stolen. 
The emails were mined by deniers to support their claims that climate 
scientists are part of a conspiracy to deceive the public about the reality 
and severity of climate change (they called this ‘Climategate’) 
(Leiserowitz et al 2012). Three independent enquiries completely 
exonerated the scientists involved (Skeptical Science 2016b). 
2. Appeals to fake experts. For example, the Heartland Institute publishes 
‘Not The IPCC’ (NIPCC) reports which are mocked up to look very similar 
to the IPCC Reports but which deny the science of climate change. The 
Heartland Institute is a right wing think tank heavily funded by the fossil 
fuel industry.4 In the 1990s it worked closely with the tobacco company 
Philip Morris to lobby against government public health reforms related 
to second-hand cigarette smoke, and for over a decade it has been one of 
the most active climate denial organisations in the US (Greenpeace USA 
2013; Oreskes and Conway 2012). The NIPCC reports only review papers 
published by climate deniers, whereas the IPCC reports review the 
 
4 The Cato Institute is very similar. See 
http://www.desmogblog.com/2012/10/23/media-watch-will-cato-dupe-media-
counterfeit-govt-copycat, accessed 3/12/13.  
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totality of the literature. As indicated earlier, there is no doubt about the 
facts: of the 13 950  peer reviewed climate articles published 1991-2012, 
only 24 reject global warming.5 Furthermore, 92% of the English-
language books  promoting denial are either written by employees of 
climate denial organisations, or are published by those organisations, or 
both (Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman 2008; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; 
Brulle 2014). 
3. Setting impossible expectations. Using this tactic, deniers highlight the 
uncertainties in climate models, and disagreements between climate 
scientists, to argue that the science is not established and thus that the 
grounds for action on climate change are insecure. This argument is 
fallacious: the bar for action on a proposition is rarely 100% certainty, in 
both political and personal life. Most of the time, what we want to know 
before acting is (a) that the proper scientific methods have been used to 
arrive at the proposition, and (b) that most scientists in the field agree 
about it (Anderson 2011). With respect to (b), by engaging in massive 
periodic literature reviews, the IPCC Reports identify what is agreed upon 
by most climate scientists as the field develops. With respect to (a), 
climate models are standardly assessed using ‘hindcasting’, which tests 
how well the models can reproduce past global temperature changes: 
only those hindcasts that include anthropogenic forcings accurately track 
observed changes since 1850 (Skeptical Science 2016c). 
 
5 http://desmogblog.com/2012/11/15/why-climate-deniers-have-no-
credibility-science-one-pie-chart, last accessed 2/12/13. 
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4. Outright deception. A prime example is Exxon’s ‘big lie’. ExxonMobil is the 
world’s largest oil and gas company. An investigation in 2015 revealed 
that top executives in Exxon knew about the warming effects of CO2 and 
the danger to humanity posed by climate change in the late 1970s, 
funding their own in house research to confirm this knowledge, and then 
developing and executing their plans for Arctic fossil fuel exploration to 
take account of the effects of climate change on the region (Inside Climate 
News 2016). Throughout this period Exxon spent upwards of $20m to 
fund climate denial and defeat climate legislation in the US (Greenpeace 
International 2016). 
 
It would be easy to dismiss each node in the network of industrial climate 
denial as an isolated event, undertaken by cranks, and amplified by the internet. 
This is false of the activities just described which are part of a well orchestrated, 
well funded strategy to undermine climate science so as to enable fossil fuel 
industries to prosper. Recent research has confirmed the connections between 
corporate-funded industrial climate denial and the ideological polarisation that 
is effective in delaying progress on environmental policy (Farrell 2016). 
Arguably, industrial climate denial is a symptom of serious problems in the U.S. 
political system that have allowed corporations to distort democratic politics 
(Mayer 2016; Dworkin 2013). But we can address the question of whether we 
ought to tolerate industrial climate denial without a full blown analysis of the 
ideal of democracy and the place of corporate money in this ideal. Instead, we 
should start by considering industrial climate denial as propaganda.  
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4. Industrial climate denial as propaganda for the fossil fuel industry 
The type of propaganda of which industrial climate denial is a token is 
what Jason Stanley calls ‘Undermining Demagoguery’.  
 
A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of 
a worthy political, economic, or rational ideal, but is in the service of a 
goal that tends to undermine that very ideal (Stanley 2015: 69). 
 
Undermining demagoguery invokes worthy ideals which are likely to be 
eroded by the goals that the demagoguery really serves. Industrial climate 
deniers claim allegiance to the following ideals: the rational ideal of good science 
(in revealing uncertainties in climate science); the political ideal of transparency 
(in uncovering a conspiracy); the economic ideal of prosperity for all (in sparing 
Americans the unnecessary economic burdens of mitigation and adaptation 
policies). In fact, industrial climate deniers: are not doing science, and do not 
improve the quality of the work of climate scientists; keep their deep 
connections with the fossil fuel industry opaque; and recommend policies that 
protect and promote the economic interests of a fossil fuel industry elite at the 
expense of the interests of humanity as a whole, present and future. The goal of 
industrial climate denial is to stymie action on climate change that would 
decrease the profits of the corporations with economic interests in the 
continuation of a carbon-based global economy (Mayer 2016). Industrial climate 
deniers are undermining demagogues because they present conduct in pursuit of 
that goal as serving other worthy ideals. 
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Undermining demagoguery can be present when those doing it are aware 
of the ways in which their propagandising undermines the ideals they claim to 
uphold, in which case the demagogues are engaged in deception. But it can also 
be present when demagogues and their audiences are blind to that fact that 
undermining demagoguery binds them together in communication. In these 
cases, Stanley argues, both parties are in the grip of a flawed ideology that masks 
the inconsistencies of the propaganda (Stanley 2015, chapters 5 and 6). Thus, the 
intentions, beliefs and motives of a speaker are irrelevant to determining 
whether they are engaged in undermining demagoguery. If those engaged in 
industrial climate denial sincerely believe the falsehoods they propagate, are 
motivated by the desire to correct what they perceive to be bad science on 
climate, and intend to make the world a better place by so doing, they may 
nevertheless be engaged in undermining demagoguery.  
In fact, there is abundant evidence that industrial climate deniers are fully 
aware that their propaganda is false, and so are engaged in straightforward 
deception of the public and policymakers at whom their communications are 
aimed. It is well documented that present industrial climate denial has its roots 
in the PR used by the tobacco industry for decades to deny the harmful effects of 
smoking cigarettes, and of second-hand smoke.6 The propagandists for Philip 
Morris asserted ‘Doubt is our product’; the propagandists for ExxonMobil 
 
6 There are a number of ‘career deniers’ whose names reappear repeatedly in 
campaigns of deception about tobacco, ozone depletion, and climate change: for 
example, Fred Singer, Fred Seitz, Bill Nierenberg, and Robert Jastrow (Oreskes 
and Conway, 2012). 
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claimed that, ‘Victory will be achieved when the average person is uncertain 
about climate science’ (Hall 2015).  
The tobacco industry’s PR campaign lies beyond the limits of toleration 
on any account of it: every person has the right to have accurate information 
about the potential harms to health of products they consume, insofar as that 
information can be provided by producers. The tobacco PR campaign directly 
violated these rights. For these reasons the campaign should have been legally 
prohibited through regulation of the vehicles through which it was pursued 
(Hilts 1996). However, the case of industrial climate denial is not so 
straightforward. Industrial climate denial is not mis-selling of a product. 
Acquiring false beliefs about climate change as a result of exposure to denial is 
unlikely to cause direct harm to the health of anyone who has been exposed to it. 
Indeed, perhaps the opposite is true: perhaps better mental health can be 
secured by a doxastic turning away from the frightening realities of climate 
change.7 The fact that industrial climate denial is undermining demagoguery is 
the key to understanding whether it ought to be tolerated, but not in virtue of 
how it damages the health of individual people. Instead, the damage that matters 
is to human security on a global and  intergenerational scale. 
5. Climate denial as a threat to human security 
Earlier on I characterised liberalism in terms of its distinctive 
commitment to freedom of expression as a fundament of any just society. A 
further fundamental commitment (with a longer pedigree) is to the security of 
 
7 Perhaps this turning away is an unavoidable coping mechanism for creatures 
with our evolutionary history and cultures (Norgaard 2011).. 
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the individual. Going back to at least John Locke, liberals have argued that one of 
the basic functions of the state is to secure for individuals political and social 
conditions in which they can live, indeed flourish, with dignity. There has been 
much internecine debate about what these conditions are, what sorts of political 
structures best secure them, and whether the nation state is the ideal site for 
these structures. For many historical liberal thinkers, the biggest threat to 
individual security was government, via intrusions on liberty, property rights, or 
anti democratic grabs on political power. Recently, the security necessary for 
human flourishing and dignity has been well captured in the idea of human 
security, which directs attention to the multifarious ways in which lives can be 
stunted and diminished. The core of this approach is the thought that hunger, 
disease, poverty, and restricted access to food and water can be as damaging to 
dignity and flourishing as threats of violence and political repression (UNDP 
1994; Commission on Human Security 2003). 
Climate change damages human security on a global and 
intergenerational scale.  Even if all countries achieve the GHG reductions laid out 
in the INDCs that fed into the Paris Agreement (Climate Action Tracker 2016), 
average temperatures are likely to rise by between 2.7C and 3.5C by 2100. 
Temperature rises in this range will catastrophically damage food production 
and security, increase disease, cause conflict over scarce resources, and displace 
millions of people and deprive them of their livelihoods and cultures (IPCC 
2014). Even if INDCs are fully achieved, the effects of cumulative emissions to 
date are likely to last 10,000 years (Clark et al 2016).  
Taking human security seriously enables us to settle on the correct frame 
for the question of whether industrial climate denial ought to be tolerated. To 
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start, consider Justice Holmes famous statement that ‘[t]he most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a 
theatre and causing a panic’.8 In a crowded theatre, the interests people have in 
not being put at risk of injury and death in a stampede to escape as a result of a 
false alarm outweighs any interest the speaker has in shouting ‘Fire!’ when there 
is no fire, and so the speaker ought to be silenced. Note here that this argument 
makes no reference to the sincerity of the speaker’s false belief: if the belief is 
false, in this context, she should not be permitted to shout it out, regardless of 
whether she sincerely believes that there is a fire. 
Is industrial climate denial like this? There are clear ways in which it is 
not. Mostly, deniers are not personally as close in space or time to those they 
address as the speaker in the theatre. And their means of communication is 
mostly non-vocal. However, these dissimilarities make no moral difference. The 
spatial and temporal propinquity of speakers to people whose interests could be 
set back by their speech is not necessary for the speech to endanger those 
interests. The transmission of a fake alarm call of ‘Fire!’ recorded weeks earlier 
and beamed in to a theatre from the other side of the world ought to be 
prohibited for the same reasons that apply to the speech that happens in the 
theatre. Instead, what justifies interference with the speech in the theatre is that 
in that context there is very limited, or no, opportunity for intervening speech to 
correct the false impression which could cause a stampede, and the conventions 
around shouting an alarm mean that people are likely to trust its veracity. Once 
 
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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‘Fire!’ is shouted, people panic, and countervailing shouts of ‘False alarm!’ are 
unlikely to be heeded. 
Is the context for industrial climate denial like this? One way in which it 
differs is that whereas the speaker in the theatre is trying to convince people that 
a danger exists when there is none, deniers are trying to convince people that a 
really existing and serious danger does not exist, or is not very serious. Another 
difference is that there are exits from the theatre that lead to safety, whereas 
there is no exit from planet Earth and the dangerous climate change that will 
ravage it for millennia to come if we do not take drastic action immediately. For 
these reasons, the speech of industrial climate deniers is far worse than the 
person in the original ‘Fire!’ example. Taking account of these differences, here is 
how the theatre example ought to be recast to capture what is morally salient to 
the question of whether industrial climate denial ought to be tolerated. 
A fire has started in the theatre, from which there are no exits. Unchecked, 
the fire will kill and injure many in the theatre, especially those in the cheapest 
seats. Many people can smell the smoke, but many others have not yet noticed 
and are still enjoying the show. Some speakers are trying to warn everyone so 
that the fire can be contained before it quickly spreads out of control; their 
warnings are measured and calm, and reflect the consensus among them on the 
causes, severity and likely impacts of the growing fire. Another group - sitting 
mainly in the most expensive seats - are trying to shout louder that there is no 
fire, or that it is not serious, or that there is plenty of time left to put it out. This 
group uses far more emotive and alarmist language, and shouts a lot about how 
the other group are not to be trusted. Many of the people in the theatre are either 
confused by these conflicting messages, or are convinced by the fire-deniers; 
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there are enough people in this combined set to significantly slow down the 
efforts of those listening to the accurate warnings who are trying to put out the 
fire. In this scenario those shouting ‘No fire!’ ought to be silenced because there 
is a fire that requires urgent and immediate action to prevent it from spreading 
and becoming uncontrollable, but the fire is not being tackled properly because 
many of the people in the theatre do not know who to trust.  
Focusing on this kind of crowded theatre scenario shows the proper site 
for debates about whether industrial climate denial ought to be tolerated. 
Ideally, people in the theatre would be properly equipped to judge with accuracy 
that the group issuing the calm and measured warnings is to be trusted. Ideally, 
this group would improve the ways in which it communicates its well grounded 
warnings so as to better enable the people in the theatre to see the danger they 
are in. And then, ideally, people would ignore the ‘No Fire!’ group, and take 
action to put out the fire. But if the fire could spread out of control before it is 
feasible for the transformations just described to take place, then the ‘No Fire!’ 
group ought to be silenced because of how their speech endangers everyone in 
the theatre. 
In conclusion, in order to decide whether industrial climate denial ought 
to be tolerated in the context of real world climate change, here are the questions 
we ought to ask, followed by the answers that would support placing industrial 
climate denial beyond the limits of liberal toleration. First, is industrial climate 
denial throwing sand in the wheels of mitigation efforts? (Yes). Second, if lay 
people were better able to judge accurately the veracity of climate science (and 
the falsity of industrial climate denial) would more progress on mitigation be 
likely? (Yes).  Third, if climate scientists became better at communicating the 
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scientific realities of climate change, would mitigation increase? (Yes). Finally, is 
there time to effect these changes within the present window for aggressive 
mitigation, beyond which there is a real risk that humanity locks in to 
catastrophic global climate change? (No).9  
 
I will not argue for any of the answers in parentheses here, although I think they 
are all correct. Those who take a different view on the fourth question in 
particular should consider the stakes in the light of the following facts about lay 
people and scientists in the world as it is. Since at least the 1980s many learned 
societies have been strenuously advocating action to evolve the public 
understanding of science, but it is not clear that much progress has been made 
(Bauer 2009). And with respect to the science community, modern science has 
deep methodological commitments which strongly incline it to caution and 
conservatism in its assertions (Brysse et al 2013). Neither of these facts is 
unalterable. The question is: given the possibility that climate change could run 
out of our control if we do not aggressively mitigate now, should we place high 
bets on successfully altering these facts at speed, or on taking emergency 
measures to prohibit industrial climate denial? 
 
  
 
9 See The Trillionth Ton for different estimates of when this window will close. 
http://www.trillionthtonne.org/. Last accessed 22 February 2016. 
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